The Long War....

A great essay on how to fight Al-Qaeda...

Ignorance about the true nature of the enemy is debilitating enough; worse is what fills the void. One popular fallacy holds that this conflict is shaped by political, rather than ideological, disputes. It is here that wishful thinking boldly asserts itself by promising simplistic, bloodless solutions to difficult problems. As the reasoning goes, if we do X -- where X could be the U.S. withdrawing from Iraq, Israel handing over the West Bank, India relinquishing its claims to Kashmir, or Europe banning doodles of Mohammed -- then our enemies would cease to be enemies and the world could return to some allegedly peaceful norm.

Such delusion is deadly. From the Sudetenland to Gaza, history warns that concessions to ideological foes not only instill a false sense of control over our adversaries, but invariably strengthen and embolden them. Hence, properly engaging the enemy requires us to know this: The conflict between Islamic expansionists and the West does not stem from political disagreements that can be assuaged by dialogue or compromise. Radical Islam seeks to wear down and ultimately destroy its opponent -- in Iraq, Israel, Europe, and everywhere else. We must focus on doing the same to radical Islam.

Another seductive fallacy maintains that the war can be successfully concluded by neutralizing a small handful of individuals and organizations. This represents more willful ignorance, and it is displayed each time a politician pledges to abandon critical fronts in favor of the search for one man, Osama bin Laden. Killing the Al Qaeda leader would serve the interests of justice and morale, but its long-term strategic impact would be limited. Indeed, Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezb'allah and their ilk are merely manifestations of a broader ideology. Dismantling these groups is important; marginalizing the ideology that breeds them is more so. There may be no easy answers for accomplishing this leviathan task, but the first step involves asking the right questions.

Finally, failure to acknowledge the enemy's Islamic origin obscures an exploitable fault line: the moderates in the Muslim world who want nothing to do with Islamism. The viability of a truly moderate, truly Islamic "moderate Islam" has been the subject of continuing debate. Nevertheless, recent events in Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq argue that, however we define them, moderating forces are at work in the Muslim world and therefore act as a natural wedge for undermining the radicals. This is an advantage that we cannot afford to ignore, but making use of it begins with recognizing the centrality of Islam to these geopolitical challenges.